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Competition and innovation: an experimental investigation 
Abstract
The paper analyzes the effects of more intense competition on firms' investments in process innovations.
More intense competition corresponds to an increase in the number of firms or a switch from Cournot to
Bertrand competition. We carry out experiments for two-stage games, where R&D investment choices
are followed by product market competition. An increase in the number of firms from two to four
reduces investments, whereas a switch from Cournot to Bertrand increases investments, even though
theory predicts a negative effect in the four-player case. The results arise both in treatments in which
both stages are implemented and in treatments in which only one stage is implemented. However, the
positive effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand competition is more pronounced in the former case.
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1 Introduction
Simple two-stage games are often used to derive predictions about the effects
of increasing competition on cost-reducing investments.1 Testing such pre-
dictions in the field is very difficult, and the literature comes to ambiguous
conclusions.2 Therefore, this paper uses laboratory experiments to explore
whether at least the basic strategic effects identified in the theoretical models
are present.
We consider four different games where two or four firms choose a cost-
reducing investment before they engage in Cournot or Bertrand competition
with homogeneous goods. Thus we can explore how increasing competi-
tion by increasing the number of players and by switching from Cournot to
Bertrand competition affects investments.3 To understand better what drives
the results, we not only considered treatments with the two-stage structure of
the underlying game, but we also analyzed one-stage treatments where sub-
jects’ investment decisions automatically result in the payoffs of the ensuing
product-market subgame. This allows us to investigate whether deviations
from the equilibrium investments in the two-stage game are driven exclusively
by expected deviations in the product-market game. Our analysis leads to
the following main insights.
(1) Investments decrease as the number of players increases.
(2) For a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition, the observed effect
on investments is positive.
(3) The positive investment effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand
competition arises even in the four-player case, where the predicted
effect is negative.
(4) Even though all three results just described arise both for the one-stage
and two-stage treatments, the positive effect of moving from Cournot
to Bertrand is more pronounced for the two-stage treatments.
1Schmutzler (2010) and Vives (2008) synthesize the existing literature.
2See the references at the end of this section.
3In a related paper, Sacco and Schmutzler (2010) analyze the effects of increasing
competition by changing the degree of substitutability in a differentiated product market.
They expose a U-shaped relation in the underlying Shubik-Levitan model, and they provide
weak experimental evidence in favor of such a relation.
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Result (1) confirms what has been observed by other authors in stochastic
static and dynamic patent races (Isaac and Reynolds, 1988, 1992). Cournot
investment games have been studied by Suetens (2005), but only for duopoly
markets.4 Thus, the number effects of competition on investment have not
been studied in a Cournot setting.5
The remaining results have not been observed elsewhere. Except for
the unpublished working papers of Sacco and Schmutzler (2008) and Darai
et al. (2009), we are not aware of any other contribution that deals with
investment games under homogeneous Bertrand competition,6 let alone with
a comparison between Cournot and Bertrand investment games.7
Result (3) has also not been observed so far, but it is related to familiar
overbidding results in the context of all-pay auctions, which are similar to
Bertrand investment games.8 Result (4) is of more general methodological
value: It shows that, to understand behavior in two-stage games, it is useful
to consider both the full two-stage game and the reduced one-stage version.
In this fashion, one can identify the sources of deviations from the first-
stage equilibrium choices more readily. Specifically, we show that first-stage
overinvestment in the Bertrand case tends to go hand in hand with above-
equilibrium prices in the second stage.
We see our experimental research as complementary to the existing field
research, which comes to ambiguous conclusions about the effects of com-
petition on investment. Broadly speaking, this ambiguity may reflect either
small differences in the strategic environment or endogeneity problems. As to
the former, Schmutzler (2010) emphasizes how the predicted effect of compe-
4Suetens (2005) focuses on the differences between investments and the Nash equi-
librium, and specifically on the role of knowledge spillovers in this context. In Suetens
(2008) the focus is on RJVs and their effect on price collusion in Bertrand competition
with product differentiation. Again she only considers duopoly markets and the effects of
increasing competition are not a matter of concern.
5Importantly, note that our analysis is distinct from the more familiar analysis of
number effects in Cournot oligopolies (Huck et al., 2004; Orzen, 2008). This literature
deals with the effects on prices and quantities rather than on investments.
6Sacco and Schmutzler (2008) consider the reduced one-stage version of a two-stage
Bertrand game, where investments precede price competition. It shows that overinvest-
ment is substantial. Overinvestment is also observed by Darai et al. (2009) where both
stages are played out, but they focus on the incentive effects of political instruments on
investment. However, both papers do not deal with the effects of increasing competition.
7Suetens and Potters (2007) compare prices and outputs in Bertrand and Cournot
games, but not investments.
8See Section 5 for a more careful discussion.
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tition on investment depends on modeling details, which would suggest that
ambiguous empirical results are merely the confirmation of ambiguous pre-
dictions. As to the endogeneity problem, it looms large in the early literature,
surveyed in Cohen and Levin (1989). While this literature regarded market
structure as an explanatory variable, the causality might run in the opposite
direction.9 Innovation may influence market structure because R&D involves
fixed costs, because it affects the pattern of firm growth in an industry or
changes the efficient scale of production. This endogeneity problem has been
taken into account to some extent by the more recent literature. Nevertheless
this literature is not very conclusive. For instance, Nickell (1996) obtains a
positive effect of competition on investments. In Aghion et al. (2005), an
inverted-U relationship between intensity of competition and investments
arises. An experimental analysis addresses both problems: It allows us to
delineate a setting in which the theoretical predictions are clear and there
are no endogeneity problems.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical
framework. Sections 3-5 describe the experimental design and results. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyze static two-stage games, where firms i = 1, ..., I first invest in
R&D and then compete in the product market. The demand function for
the homogeneous product is given by D(p) = a − p, with a > 0. All firms
i are identical ex-ante, with constant marginal costs c > 0. In the first
stage, firms simultaneously choose R&D investments Yi ∈ [0, c), resulting
in marginal costs ci = c − Yi. The cost of R&D is given by kY
2
i , where
k > 0. In the second stage, firms simultaneously choose quantities (Cournot
competition) or prices (Bertrand competition).
9For an introduction to more recent evidence on that matter, see Gilbert (2006).
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2.1 Cournot Competition
For the Cournot case, backward induction shows that the net payoff function
of firm i in the first stage is given by
Πi(Y1, ..., YI , α, k) =
(
α + IYi −
∑
i 6=j Yj
I + 1
)2
− kY 2i , (1)
where α ≡ a− c represents the demand parameter.10
The gross payoff of firm i, that is, the first term on the right-hand side
of (1), depends positively on its own investment and the demand parameter,
and negatively on the investments of the other firms. The following result is
immediate11:
Proposition 1 Under Cournot competition the symmetric pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium investment levels are
Y C =
αI
k(I + 1)2 − I
. (2)
By (2), equilibrium investments are increasing in the demand parameter
α, and decreasing in the cost parameter k and in the number of firms I.
2.2 Bertrand Competition
For Bertrand Competition, backward induction shows that the net payoff
function of firm i can be written as a function of efficiency levels as follows:
Πi(·) =
{
(Yi − Y
m
−i)D(c− Y
m
−i)− kY
2
i , if Yi > Y
m
−i
−kY 2i , if Yi ≤ Y
m
−i
, (3)
where Y m−i = maxj 6=i Yj. Compared to the Cournot case, competition is in-
tense in the sense that a firm can achieve a positive gross payoff only by
investing more than the highest investment of the others. If Yi > Y
m
−i , maxi-
mizing (3) with respect to Yi gives
∂Πi(·)
∂Yi
= D(c− Y m−i)− 2kYi ≡ 0. (4)
10Here and in the following, we assume that α+ IYi −
∑
i6=j Yj ≥ 0.
11We assume that the second order condition holds, that is, I2/(I + 1)2 − k < 0, which
is fulfilled for arbitrary I ≥ 2 if k ≥ 1.
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Yi ≤ Y
m
−i can only be a best response if Yi = 0 holds: If firm i does not
invest more than all others, it gets a negative net payoff. In such a case
the deviation to Yi = 0 is profitable. The pure-strategy equilibrium is thus
characterized as follows (Sacco and Schmutzler, 2008, Prop. 7).
Proposition 2 (i) Under Bertrand Competition, for k > 1
2
, there are multi-
ple asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria with one firm investing Y Bi =
α
2k
and
firms j 6= i investing Y Bj = 0. (ii) There are no other pure-strategy equilibria.
Proposition 2 implies that the average investments are Y
B
= α
2kI
, which
is increasing in α, and decreasing in k and in I. It is unlikely that agents can
coordinate on one of the asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria. We therefore
refer to the following result of Sacco and Schmutzler (2008).
Proposition 3 The investment game with Bertrand Competition has a sym-
metric mixed-strategy equilibrium, where firms mix between all strategies up
to a cut-off level.12
Of course, one may be concerned with the relevance of mixed-strategy
equilibria in the context of an oligopoly with a small number of players.
We clearly do not expect decision makers in firms to randomize deliberately.
Also, the common justification that mixed-strategy equilibria describe behav-
ior in large populations of players, each of which takes non-random decisions,
makes no sense in our context. A more convincing a priori justification relies
on standard purification arguments (Harsanyi, 1973).13
2.3 The Effects of Increasing Competition
We now consider the predicted effects of competition on investment.
Corollary 1 (i) The average equilibrium investments are decreasing in I for
both Bertrand and Cournot competition.
(ii) Suppose that k > max
{
1
2
, I
2
(I+1)2
}
. The average equilibrium investment
12The game also has asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria where some firms always play
zero and others randomize.
13Specifically, one can consider a Bayesian game with a continuum of players with sta-
tistically independent types, reflecting small differences in payoffs. The mixed-strategy
equilibrium of the complete information game is then close to the equilibria of nearby
Bayesian games.
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for Cournot is higher than the average investment in each asymmetric pure-
strategy equilibrium for Bertrand for I ≥ 3. For I = 2, average investments
are higher for Bertrand unless k ≤ 2.
Though we cannot provide such results for the mixed-strategy equilibrium
at this level of generality, a similar statement holds for the parameters we
choose (see 3.2). Thus, except for the caveat for I = 2, for both concepts of
competitiveness, an increase in competition reduces investment.
Both of these changes in the competitive environment have the common
feature that they correspond to reductions in the mark-ups that firms can
command in the product market equilibrium. To see the crucial difference,
note that an increase in the number of competitors in a Cournot setting
has a fairly smooth effect on the nature of competition. Most importantly,
both firms can obtain positive profits before and after the change in competi-
tion. As one moves from Cournot to Bertrand, the change in the competitive
environment is more dramatic: It is well known that at most one firm can
obtain a positive profit in the Bertrand investment game when both firms
choose equilibrium prices in the ensuing subgame; so that competition is of a
winner-takes-all nature. Thus, without correct expectations about competi-
tor investments players may easily take very bad decisions. The Bertrand
game has multiple asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria, a symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium and even asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. It is
not obvious how players coordinate in a static setting. We use the mixed-
strategy equilibria as the benchmark to predict equilibrium investments in
the Bertrand game, whereas we resort to the symmetric pure-strategy equi-
librium in the Cournot case.
3 Experimental Design
We now describe the treatments, the parameters and the hypotheses.
3.1 Treatments
We conducted eight treatments (see Table 1), which differed in the following
three dimensions:
1. The number of players (two vs. four)
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2. The mode of competition (Bertrand vs. Cournot)
3. The number of stages played out (one vs. two)
Type of competition
Number of players Bertrand Cournot
I = 2 B2, 2 sessions C2, 2 sessions
I = 4 B4, 2 sessions C4, 2 sessions
For each treatment we ran two sessions, one with one stage and one with two stages played out.
Table 1: Treatments
The need for the first two treatment variations is obvious given our ques-
tions of interest. The third point requires some clarification. To capture
the models introduced in Section 2 accurately, the two-stage treatments are
adequate and, arguably, they are also more realistic. However, in such treat-
ments, there may be confusion about the source of possible deviations from
the equilibrium in the investment game. Broadly, one can imagine two classes
of deviations. First, subjects may be expecting non-equilibrium behavior in
the product market stage.14 For instance, they might believe that all parties
(including themselves) collude below the equilibrium output in the Cournot
game, in which case they should rationally choose lower than equilibrium
investments in the first stage. Second, even when they do not expect such
deviations in the product market game, players may want to deviate from
equilibrium investments for other reasons. For example, they might real-
ize that investments involve negative externalities, and they may want to
coordinate on lower investments that make all players better off.
To identify which of these two types of deviations arise, we conducted
all treatments in two different versions which we call one- and two-stage
treatments. In the latter, subjects play the product market game as well
as the investment game. In the one-stage treatments subjects only choose
investment levels, and payoffs for each choice of investments correspond to
the payoffs in the equilibrium of the ensuing product market subgame by
assumption. Thus deviations from equilibrium cannot result from expected
deviations in the product market game. Thereby we can identify to which
14Such deviations are known to arise both in the Bertrand (Dufwenberg and Gneezy,
2000) and in the the Cournot case (Huck et al., 2004, and many others).
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extent deviations in the two-stage game are attributable to each source of
deviations.
3.2 Parameters and Predictions
We chose parameter values α = 30 and k = 3. We restricted the strategy
sets to Yi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 9}. Restricting choices to discrete strategies had two
main advantages. First, we could present information on payoffs (gross of
investment costs) in simple matrices. Second, in this fashion, the integers no
longer play the role of prominent numbers.
The downside is that the equilibria of the discrete game reflect the nega-
tive effect of increasing the number of players on investments only imperfectly.
For some parameters, increases in the number of players have no effect. For
instance, equilibrium investments are (2, 2) for the two-player Cournot game
and (2, 2, 2, 2) for the four-player game. While the equilibria of the discrete
game are the more natural benchmark for individual behavior given the dis-
crete strategy sets, it will turn out to be instructive to compare average
behavior with the corresponding continuous games. The equilibria for these
games are (2.4, 2.4) and (1.69, 1.69, 1.69, 1.69), so that the investment effect
of increasing the number of players is negative.
For Bertrand competition, there is no such problem: According to Propo-
sition 2, there are asymmetric equilibria, each with one firm investing 5 and
the other firm(s) 0. This holds both for the discrete and continuous strategy
set. Moreover, using the formulas provided by Sacco and Schmutzler (2008),
one can show that the two-player game has a symmetric mixed-strategy equi-
librium (MSE) given by
(p0, ..., p9) = (0.1, 0.193, 0.187, 0.182, 0.176, 0.160, 0, 0, 0, 0) . (5)
For the four-player game, the symmetric MSE is given by
(p0, ..., p9) = (0.464, 0.2, 0.119, 0.088, 0.071, 0.057, 0, 0, 0, 0) . (6)
The expected investment levels (2.62 for the two-player and 1.27 for the
four-player Bertrand game) are close to the average investments (Y
B2
= 2.5;
Y
B4
= 1.25) of the pure-strategy equilibria.
Table 2 provides an overview of the equilibrium investments.
We use the equilibrium predictions to derive the following hypotheses
about the effects of increasing competition.
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Equilibrium investment
Model discrete continuous mixed
Cournot I = 2 (2, 2) (2.4, 2.4) -
Cournot I = 4 (2, 2, 2, 2) (1.69, 1.69, 1.69, 1.69) -
Bertrand I = 2 (5, 0) (5, 0) (2.62, 2.62)
Bertrand I = 4 (5, 0, 0, 0) (5, 0, 0, 0) (1.27, 1.27, 1.27, 1.27)
For the mixed equilibria we show expected investment levels, see equations (5) and (6).
Table 2: Equilibria
Hypothesis 1 Increasing competition in the sense of switching from two to
four players has a non-positive effect on investments in the Cournot case and
reduces investments in the Bertrand case.
The non-positive effect on investments in the Cournot case is consistent
with the prediction of no effect from the discrete game and of a negative
effect from the continuous game.
Hypothesis 2 Increasing competition in the sense of switching from Cournot
to Bertrand competition increases investments in the two-player case and
reduces investments in the four-player case.
The two predictions of Hypothesis 2 can be derived by using the equilibria
of the discrete game as well as those of the continuous game. They hold for
the asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria and the symmetric MSE.
3.3 Subjects and Payments
The experimental sessions were conducted between November 2008 and Febru-
ary 2009 at the University of Zurich. The participants were undergraduate
students.15 We implemented four sessions with Bertrand treatments, and
four with Cournot treatments (see Table 1). Two of the Bertrand and two of
the Cournot sessions were two-player treatments. In each session there were
20 periods. No subject participated in more than one session. The four-
player sessions had 32 subjects; each two-player session had 36 subjects. The
36 (32) subjects of the two-player (four-player) treatments were randomly
15We did not exclude any disciplines. We had students of law, engineering, psychology,
economics etc.
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divided in matching groups of four (eight) subjects each at the beginning
of the experiment. Within the matching groups we applied the stranger de-
sign, i.e. randomly rematched subjects into groups of two (four) after each
period.16 Thus, we obtained nine (four) independent observations per two
(four)-player session. Sessions lasted about 90 minutes each.
At the end of each period, subjects were informed about the investment of
the other subject(s) in their group and their own net payoff for that period.
When the second stage was played out, they were informed about the invest-
ment of the other subject(s) in their group before choosing price or quantity
and after the second stage they also learned the price or the quantity decision
of the other group member(s). Participants received an initial endowment of
CHF 35 (≈EUR 23). Average earnings including the endowment were be-
tween CHF 30 (≈EUR 20) and CHF 36 (≈EUR 23) for the Bertrand sessions
and between CHF 39 (≈EUR 26) and CHF 49 (≈EUR 33) for the Cournot
sessions. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the soft-
ware z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited using ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004).
4 Results
In Section 4.1 we provide a brief overview of the results. In Section 4.2, we
look at our hypotheses in more detail.
4.1 Overview
Here and in the following, we always use matching group averages as in-
dependent observations. Kruskal-Wallis tests reveal that we can reject the
hypothesis that the investment levels of all treatments, of all one-, or of all
two-stage treatments are drawn from the same population.17
16Thanks to the matching group approach, we obtain sufficiently many independent ob-
servations while reducing the possibility of repeated game behavior. Nevertheless, subjects
may “learn” from the past prices/quantities chosen by the other players in their matching
groups. Modeling how the firms arrive at their beliefs about the other player’s future
prices when they choose investments is beyond the scope of this paper, however.
17The null-hypothesis of no differences is rejected with a p-value of 0.000, if all treatments
are considered. If we take only the one (two)-stage treatments into account the p-value is
0.006 (0.000).
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Figure 1 illustrates how investments vary across treatments. Each panel
contains the average per-period investments for one of the four cases, distin-
guishing between the one-stage and the two-stage treatments. It also shows
the equilibrium investments.18 Based on this descriptive evidence, we arrive
at the following tentative conclusions.
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Figure 1: Average investment per period
1. Increasing the number of players leads to lower average investments in
the Cournot and the Bertrand case.19
18In the Cournot case, we depict the equilibria of the continuous game; recall that the
equilibria for the discrete game are (2, 2) and (2, 2, 2, 2), respectively.
19These results are supported by pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests. We find significant
differences between C2 and C4 as well as between B2 and B4. One-tailed tests reject the
null hypothesis of no differences in average investments in favor of higher investment levels
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2. Moving from Cournot to Bertrand competition leads to greater average
investments for the two-player and four-player treatments.20
3. For the four-player case, the positive effect of moving from Cournot to
Bertrand competition holds even though the predicted effect is nega-
tive.21
4. The positive investment effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand
competition is more pronounced in the two-stage treatments.22
4.2 Comparative Statics
We now analyze the comparative statics effects in more detail.
4.2.1 Number Effects
To investigate the number effects, we consider OLS models23 of all Cournot
treatments as well as of the one- and two-stage treatments separately; simi-
larly for the Bertrand case. The model is given by
yit = β0 + β1δ
i
I4 +
3∑
s=1
βs+1δ
i
Ps + β5δ
i
one−stage + β6δ
i
I4∗one−stage + e
i
t, (7)
in C2 (B2) than in C4 (B4) at a p-value of 0.025 (0.048) for the one-stage treatments, and
respectively at a p-value of 0.010 (0.003) for the two-stage treatments. Pooling the data
of the one- and two-stage treatments results a p-value of 0.001 (0.000).
20The result for the two-player case is supported by a one-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test
for the two-player one-stage (p=0.005) and two-stage treatments (p=0.000) and for the
pooled data (p=0.000). For the four-player case, a two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test does
not reject the hypothesis of no differences in investment levels between the two four-player
one-stage treatments with a p-value of 0.200. For the two-stage treatments it rejects the
null with a p-value of 0.029 and for the pooled data with a p-value of 0.001 if we pool the
data. However the mean ranks are always higher in B4 than in C4.
21This predicted negative effect holds not only for the equilibrium of the continuous
Cournot game depicted Figure 1, but also for the equilibrium of the discrete Cournot
game, where average investments are 2 and thus higher than in the Bertrand MSE (1.27).
22In the C2 one (two)-stage treatment we observe average investment of 2.51 (2.22) and
1.94 (1.57) in the C4 treatment. However, in the B2 one (two)-stage treatments we observe
average investment of 3.10 (3.55) and 2.42 (2.56) for B4 treatments.
23We correct the standard error for matching group clusters in all OLS models presented
in the following.
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where δiI4 is a dummy variable for intense competition (four players rather
than two), and δiPs are dummy variables for the first, second, and third
quarter of periods. When we use the data of all treatments, we consider two
additional dummy variables δione−stage which is equal to one for the one-stage
treatments and δiI4∗one−stage which captures the interaction effect between the
number of players and the type of treatment.
investment investment investment
(1-stage) (2-stage) (1- and 2-stage)
Cournot Treatments
I4 -0.575∗∗∗ (0.186) -0.648∗∗∗ (0.184) -0.648∗∗∗ (0.180)
P1st−quarter 0.415
∗∗ (0.138) 0.682∗∗∗ (0.149) 0.549∗∗∗ (0.107)
P2nd−quarter 0.141 (0.103) 0.265
∗∗∗ (0.068) 0.203∗∗∗ (0.063)
P3rd−quarter 0.053 (0.069) 0.047 (0.044) 0.050 (0.040)
one-stage 0.296 (0.178)
I4*one-stage 0.073 (0.256)
constant 2.362∗∗∗ (0.112) 1.970∗∗∗ (0.106) 2.018∗∗∗ (0.120)
R2 0.082 (N=1360) 0.113 (N=1360) 0.114 (N=2720)
Bertrand Treatments
I4 -0.675∗∗ (0.293) -0.992∗∗∗ (0.205) -0.992∗∗∗ (0.201)
P1st−quarter 0.626
∗ (0.313) 1.044∗∗∗ (0.178) 0.835∗∗∗ (0.178)
P2nd−quarter 0.491
∗ (0.275) 0.382∗∗ (0.131) 0.437∗∗∗ (0.150)
P3rd−quarter 0.294
∗∗ (0.100) 0.135 (0.173) 0.215∗∗ (0.099)
one-stage -0.451∗∗ (0.207)
I4*one-stage 0.317 (0.351)
constant 2.744∗∗∗ (0.161) 3.158∗∗∗ (0.149) 3.177∗∗∗ (0.172)
R2 0.026 (N=1360) 0.078 (N=1360) 0.051 (N=2720)
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Number effects in Cournot and Bertrand treatments
Table 3 shows that the estimated coefficient for β1 in the one-stage Cournot
model is −0.575 and highly significant. For the two-stage treatments, we ob-
tain a highly significant β1 of −0.648. Thus, the comparative statics are
essentially the same in one-stage and two-stage treatments.24 This result is
24Using a t-test, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis of no difference between the two
estimated coefficients (|t| = 0.2790).
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supported by an insignificant stage and interaction effect if we pool the data.
Finally, for both the one-stage and the two-stage treatments, we see that
investments decrease over time.
For the Bertrand treatments, the effect of the number of players on in-
vestments has the predicted sign and is significant for the one– and two-stage
treatments.25 But the stage effect in the third Column is significant and neg-
ative. The interaction effect is insignificant which means that the number
effect does not differ between the one- and two-stage treatments. Again we
find that investment levels are significantly higher in earlier periods.
Summing up, we obtain the following confirmation of Hypothesis 1.
Result 1 For Cournot and Bertrand competition, investments are higher for
two than for four players. Even though investment levels in one-stage and
two-stage treatments differ, there is no significant difference in the size of the
number effect across treatments.
4.2.2 Cournot vs. Bertrand
We now consider the effect of moving from soft Cournot to intense Bertrand
competition, considering OLS models of the one-stage and two-stage treat-
ments separately and jointly. The models include δiBertrand as a dummy vari-
able for intense (Bertrand) competition and dummy variables δiPs for the first,
second, and third quarter of periods. δione−stage is a dummy variable for the
one-stage treatment and δiBertrand∗one−stage is the interaction effect between
the type of competition and treatment.
yit = β0+β1δ
i
Bertrand+
3∑
s=1
βs+1δ
i
Ps+β5δ
i
one−stage+β6δ
i
Bertrand∗one−stage+e
i
t. (8)
Table 4 summarizes the results. In all three models, the effect of compe-
tition on investment is positive and highly significant for the two-player case.
In the four-player case the result is positive and significant for the two–stage
treatments.26
Result 2 Mean investments are higher for the Bertrand game than for the
corresponding Cournot games.
25Running a t-test reveals that the difference between the two estimated coefficients is
not significant (|t| = 0.8865).
26The period dummies show that investments decrease significantly as time goes by,
independent of the data selection.
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investment investment investment
(1-stage) (2-stage) (1- and 2-stage)
Two-Player Treatments
Bertrand 0.583∗∗∗ (0.170) 1.331∗∗∗ (0.217) 1.331∗∗∗ (0.213)
P1st−quarter 0.386
∗ (0.199) 0.783∗∗∗ (0.201) 0.585∗∗∗ (0.144)
P2nd−quarter 0.311 (0.215) 0.317
∗∗ (0.123) 0.314∗∗ (0.122)
P3rd−quarter 0.147
∗∗ (0.067) 0.033 (0.129) 0.090 (0.072)
one-stage 0.296 (0.177)
Bertrand*one-stage -0.747∗∗∗ (0.271)
constant 2.303∗∗∗ (0.138) 1.935∗∗∗ (0.126) 1.971∗∗∗ (0.131)
R2 0.028 (N=1440) 0.185 (N=1440) 0.094 (N=2880)
Four-Player Treatments
Bertrand 0.483 (0.310) 0.986∗∗∗ (0.172) 0.986∗∗∗ (0.166)
P1st−quarter 0.672
∗ (0.298) 0.953∗∗∗ (0.122) 0.813∗∗∗ (0.160)
P2nd−quarter 0.322 (0.227) 0.331
∗∗∗ (0.076) 0.327∗∗ (0.115)
P3rd−quarter 0.203 (0.128) 0.156 (0.123) 0.180
∗ (0.086)
one-stage 0.369∗ (0.186)
Bertrand*one-stage -0.503 (0.342)
constant 1.640∗∗∗ (0.190) 1.210∗∗∗ (0.142) 1.241∗∗∗ (0.150)
R2 0.030 (N=1280) 0.088 (N=1280) 0.060 (N=2560)
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Effects of the type of competition in two- and four-player treatments
In the four-player game this contradicts the equilibrium prediction that
investments are lower for the Bertrand case.27
Result 3 In the four-player case, the positive investment effect of moving
from Cournot to Bertrand competition arises even though the predicted effect
is negative.
Next, compare one-stage and two-stage treatments. In the two-player
as well as the four-player case, β1 is larger for the two-stage treatments.
The difference is significant for the two-player case (|t| = 2.7135), but not
for the four-player case (|t| = 1.4188). This is also shown by the highly
27The predicted effect is negative: In the continuous game, the effect is 1.27-1.69=-0.42;
in the discrete game it is 1.27-2=-0.73.
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significant interaction term in the two-player case, i.e. the effect of Bertrand
competition on investment is different for one- and two-stage treatments.
With this qualification, we summarize:
Result 4 The effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand competition tends
to be more positive for two-stage than for one-stage treatments.
5 Understanding Overinvestment
We now investigate why the effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand com-
petition (i) is positive even when the prediction is that it is negative and
(ii) is more pronounced in the two-stage treatments. We consider the OLS
regression
4yit = y
i
t − y
i∗
t = β0 + e
i
t, (9)
with yi∗t standing for the predicted investment. If subjects invest according
to the prediction, the estimated constant β0 should be zero. The results for
all treatments are presented in Table 7 in the Appendix.
The most important observation is the highly significant overinvestment
in all two-and four-player Bertrand treatments. The overinvestment is sig-
nificantly higher (|t| = 2.108) in the two-player two-stage treatments than
in the one-stage treatments and significantly higher (|t| = 2.105) in the one-
stage four-player than in the one-stage two-player treatments. The Cournot
case essentially confirms the equilibrium prediction for the continuous model
(see Table 3), whereas in the two-player discrete model there is overinvest-
ment. The fact that the continuous model is a better predictor for average
investments than the discrete model is worth emphasizing. To understand
why the switch from Cournot to Bertrand tends to have a strong positive
effect on investments, however, one mainly has to find out what lies behind
the overinvestment in the Bertrand case. Further, one needs to understand
why the overinvestment is more pronounced for the two-stage treatments.
Before we deal with these issues, note the relation between our overinvest-
ment and the overbidding observations that have emerged in the literature on
all-pay auctions. In a Bertrand investment game, even when all players invest
a positive amount, only one player can earn positive profits if second-period
equilibrium prices are set. However, contrary to standard all-pay auctions,
the size of the bids affects not only the chances of winning, but also the
prize. In particular, at least in the one-stage version, when the difference
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to the second-highest bid is close to zero, so is the winner’s prize. In spite
of these differences in the strategic setting, our overinvestment results are
similar to the overbidding that arises in fixed-prize all-pay auctions.28
5.1 Reasons for Overinvestment
To understand overinvestment in the Bertrand case, consider the following
evidence.
(1) Investments decrease strongly over time.
(2) There is substantial cross-player heterogeneity.
(3) In the four player-treatments, players obtain negative profits on average
in all periods, but the losses are decreasing over time. In the two-player
treatments, average profits are mostly positive.
(4) Compared to the MSE, the overinvestment comes mainly from too low
weight on low positive strategies rather than too low weight on zero.
Point (1) has already been made in Section 4.2.
Point (2) is illustrated in Figure 2. This figure is a histogram of average
per-player investments in the four Bertrand treatments. The heterogeneity
across players is substantial.29 As to (3), consider Figure 3, which shows how
profits developed over times for the one- and two-stage case. The differences
between the two-player and the four-player case are evident.30
Figure 4 in the Appendix confirms (4). In all treatments, subjects choose
1 and 2 much less frequently than in the MSE. The differences for zero
investments are much smaller, and in one case (B2, one-stage) there are
more zero investments than predicted by the MSE.
28Most closely related is Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) who consider symmetric all-
pay auctions with 4, 8, and 12 players and also observe overinvestment. Like us, these
authors obtain overbidding that diminishes over time, but remains substantial even in
later periods. See also Davis and Reilly (1998).
29A figure with all individual investment paths (available on request) reveals substantial
variety in another dimension: A considerable fraction of the players had one or two pre-
ferred investment choices that were chosen at least half the time. Almost as many players
hardly ever chose the same investment level twice in a row.
30A two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test rejects the null hypothesis of no differences be-
tween the one- and two-stage two-player treatments (p = 0.000), but the test cannot reject
the null hypothesis in the four-player case (p = 0.200).
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Figure 2: Average observed investment per subject for all Bertrand treat-
ments
Our observations suggest a number of possible explanations for the over-
investment, all of which would apply both in the one-stage and the two-stage
treatments.
1. Joy of winning : Subjects do not care exclusively about monetary pay-
offs, but derive an independent benefit from winning the game.
2. Efficiency considerations : Subjects deviate from equilibrium in order
to come closer to joint-payoff maximization.31
3. Reputation effects : Subjects hope to induce others to refrain from in-
vesting.
31See, e.g., Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
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Figure 3: Average profits over time of all Bertrand treatments
4. Confusion: Subjects are at least initially unaware of the high risk of
making losses with high investment choices.
5. Optimism: Subjects are aware of the possible losses, but overestimate
the chances that others choose lower investments.
Given the heterogeneity of individual profiles, it seems unlikely that a
single explanation applies to all players. Joy of winning, for instance, is con-
sistent with the observation that subjects tend not to choose low investment
levels if they invest at all.32 However, because of the substantial reductions
in investments over time,33 joy of winning cannot explain all observations.
32This argument is closely related to Sheremeta (2010) who allows for joy of winning in
the utility function in an analysis of contests and provides experimental evidence for it.
33See regression results in Section 4.2.
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Efficiency considerations are not an entirely convincing explanation either.
At least for I = 4, the deviations from equilibrium reduce joint profits (which
are zero in expectation in the MSE). For I = 2, however, in most periods,
average profits are positive, so that subjects indeed come closer to joint-profit
maximization.
Among the other explanations, the appeal of reputation effects is limited:
player identities were not common knowledge. The other explanations all
have some merits. Players invest a lot and earn negative profits in early
periods, which is consistent both with confusion and excessive optimism that
fade away over time. Also, it is suggestive that these effects are stronger in
the four-player case, where the strategic uncertainty is compounded by the
fact that three opponents are present in each period. Finally, as Figure 4
shows, 10-15 % of the investments in all Bertrand treatments are weakly
dominated strategies (6 or higher), also suggesting some degree of confusion.
Although we can rule out that overinvestment results exclusively from
anticipated deviations in the two-stage game, we still have to explain why
the comparative-statics effect is more pronounced in the two-stage case than
in the one-stage case.
5.2 The role of the second stage
In the four-player games, averaging over all subgames, the observed output
in the Bertrand (Cournot) case is only 1% (4%) lower than predicted.
For arbitrary investment decisions, the subgame equilibrium for Bertrand
competition leads to higher market outputs than for Cournot competition.
Consistent with this prediction, market outputs are higher in the Bertrand
treatments than in the Cournot treatments, after controlling for average in-
vestments.34 There are 14 different average investment levels that arise both
in the Bertrand and the Cournot case. In 12 of these cases, the Bertrand
outputs are higher than the Cournot outputs. Nevertheless, outputs tend to
be lower than in equilibrium in the Bertrand treatment.
Analyzing individual behavior in the second stage, however, is more in-
formative than considering only aggegate behavior. The key insight is that
34In the Bertrand case (not in the Cournot case), the average equilibrium outputs may
depend on the precise investment profile rather than merely on average investments. A
clean comparison of market outputs would therefore condition on investment profiles rather
than on averages. However, there are very few investment vectors that were chosen both
in the Cournot and in the Bertrand treatments, so that this approach is not informative.
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deviations from equilibrium (“collusion”) in the second stage have different
effects on the first period actions in the Cournot and in the Bertrand cases.
In the Cournot case, collusion means that subjects choose lower outputs than
in equilibrium in the second stage. Anticipating this, the value of investment
is lower than it would be with equilibrium outputs. Thus, if subjects plan to
set low outputs, they invest less in the two-stage game than in the one-stage
version.
In the Bertrand case on which we focus here, the role of the second stage is
much more subtle. A firm always runs the risk that there is another firm with
a lower price, so that investments may be useless. Its willingness to invest will
depend on how it perceives this risk – a firm will invest only if it is sufficiently
confident that its competitors will not set lower prices than itself. Modeling
how the firm arrives at its beliefs about the other players’ future prices when
it chooses investments is beyond the scope of this paper. But suppose there is
some exogenous difference in the firms’ “optimism“. Optimistic firms believe
that their competitors will not set prices aggressively, and they will therefore
put a high probability on the chance of winning even with a substantial own
mark-up. Firms that are more optimistic than others – for whatever reason
– should thus set high prices (because they expect to get away with it) and
choose high investments (because they put a high probability on winning in
spite of high prices).
ci < min{c−i} ci = min{c−i} ci > min{c−i}
∑
Two-Player Treatment
pi < p
∗ 16% 4% 11% 12%
pi = p
∗ 31% 64% 34% 39%
pi > p
∗ 53% 32% 54% 49%
N 287 146 287 720
Four-Player Treatment
pi < p
∗ 12% 8% 7% 8%
pi = p
∗ 28% 64% 54% 49%
pi > p
∗ 60% 28% 39% 43%
N 139 50 451 640
Note: p∗ comprises both the continuous and the discrete equilibrium.
Table 5: Deviation from the equilibrium price p∗ in Bertrand two-stage treat-
ments
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Closer analysis of the data shows that this is precisely what happens. To
see this, first consider Table 5 which shows that prices above the subgame
equilibrium p∗35 are indeed quite common.36 In particular, 53% (60%) of the
firms with the lowest marginal costs set prices above p∗ in the two (four)-
player treatment.
ci < min{c−i} ci = min{c−i} ci > min{c−i}
∑
Two-Player Treatment
pi ≤ p
∗ 4.07 3.38 1.54 2.98
pi > p
∗ 5.22 4.32 3.01 4.13
Four-Player Treatment
pi ≤ p
∗ 4.78 2.81 0.34 1.25
pi > p
∗ 6.36 4.93 3.29 4.32
Note: p∗ comprises both the continuous and the discrete equilibrium.
Table 6: Average investment in Bertrand two-stage treatments
Table 6 elaborates on this by giving the average investments both for the
case that prices are below or essentially at the equilibrium (pi ≤ p
∗) and
the case of above-equilibrium prices (pi > p
∗). In the former case, invest-
ments tend to be lower than in the latter. This confirms the interpretation
that above equilibrium (“collusive”) prices and high investments tend to go
together.
We finally add some brief comments on the Cournot investment game.
We consider the four-player game. Interestingly, when the average invest-
ments are close to the equilibrium prediction, the same is true for market
outputs in the second stage.37 More generally, there is a clear and significant
relation between outputs and investments. When we regress the outputs of
a firm over own investments and competitor investments, the former have
a positive effect, whereas the latter have a negative effect.38 Both of these
35The second stage of the discrete Bertrand game has the following subgame perfect
equilibria: (i) if ci = min{c−i} − 1 or ci = min{c−i}, then p
∗
i = ci or p
∗ = ci + 1; (ii) if
ci < min{c−i} − 1, then p
∗
i = c−i − 1; (iii) if ci > min{c−i}, then p
∗
i ≥ ci.
36Note, however, that we observe merely in 12% (9%) of the two (four)-player markets
successful collusion, i.e. that both players in the two-player or the two players with the
lowest marginal cost in the four-player treatment set the same price above p∗.
37In the 14 cases where the average individual investment is 2, the average market output
is 24.5 (as opposed to 25.6 in the continuous subgame equilibrium).
38The equilibrium output of firm i is qi =
a−c
5
+ 4
5
yi −
1
5
∑
j 6=i yj . In an OLS regression
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effects are consistent with the theoretical prediction, but smaller. Intuitively,
the marginal effect of higher output on profits increases when own costs are
low and decreases when competitor costs are low (because low-cost competi-
tors produce a higher output and hence market prices are lower). Conversely,
the value of investing is higher when one expects to produce high outputs.
The logic of the relation between investments and outputs is therefore re-
lated to, but different from the Bertrand case. There, investments were high-
est for firms in situations with high prices, because optimistic firms would
chose high investments and expect to get away with high prices. Now opti-
mistic firms expect competitors to choose low investments and low outputs.
Therefore, optimistic firms should choose high investments and high out-
puts.
6 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the effects of more intense competition on invest-
ments in simple two-stage R&D models. In the first stage, firms whose
marginal costs are identical ex-ante simultaneously invest in R&D. The in-
vestment leads to a decrease in marginal costs. In the second stage of the
game, firms simultaneously choose quantities or prices in a homogeneous
good market. We show that an increase in the number of firms tends to
reduce investments, whereas a shift from Cournot to Bertrand increases in-
vestments. The latter observation is partly predicted by theory (for two
firms) and partly the result of overinvestment in the Bertrand case.
A simple set of experiments cannot resolve the debate about the effects
of competition on investment. First, there are conceptual ambiguities at the
theoretical level. Even the definition of increasing competition is contentious,
some insightful attempts to structure the debate notwithstanding.39 Second,
even for specific notions of increasing competition in two-stage games, there
are many models to investigate the issue.40 Finally, one may worry about the
with outputs as dependent and investments and period dummies as independent variables,
the coefficients are 0.340 for yi (significant at the 1%-level) and −0.089 for yj (significant
at the 10%-level).
39See for instance Boone (2008).
40Vives (2008) provides a unifying discussion of two-stage games, with the extent of
product differentiation as an inverse measure of competition. Schmutzler (2010) extends
the discussion to other measures of competition.
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external validity of the laboratory setting as a means of testing predictions
about the long-term strategic decisions of managers in large firms.
However, our analysis provides a clear result that is worthy of further
investigation: In some situations, there are behavioral effects that support a
positive effect of competition on investment.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Tables
Cournot I = 2, yi∗t = 2
(1) (2) (3)
∆yit ∆y
i
t ∆y
i
t
β0 0.514
∗∗∗ (0.126) 0.218 (0.135) 0.366∗∗∗ (0.097)
N 720 720 1440
Cournot I = 4, yi∗t = 2
(1) (2) (3)
∆yit ∆y
i
t ∆y
i
t
β0 -0.061 (0.154) -0.430
∗ (0.141) -0.245∗ (0.119)
N 640 640 1280
Bertrand I = 2, yi∗t = 2.62
(1) (2) (3)
∆yit ∆y
i
t ∆y
i
t
β0 0.477
∗∗∗ (0.121) 0.929∗∗∗ (0.177) 0.703∗∗∗ (0.118)
N 720 720 1440
Bertrand I = 4, yi∗t = 1.27
(1) (2) (3)
∆yit ∆y
i
t ∆y
i
t
β0 1.152
∗∗ (0.297) 1.286∗∗∗ (0.121) 1.219∗∗∗ (0.151)
N 640 640 1280
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for matching group clusters.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 7: Observed and predicted investment
In model (1) we use one-stage data, in model (2) two-stage, and in model
(3) we pool one- and two-stage data.
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7.2 Figures
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Figure 4: Observed investment levels in all Bertrand treatments and pre-
dicted MSE investment levels
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